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1

A. Girard v. American Airlines, Inc. et al. 2

The Court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs mJury
occurred in the course of embarkment, but held that it was an issue of
fact as to whether plaintiffs fall and subsequent injury constituted an
"accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Plaintiff
sustained injuries when she fell as she was exiting a bus with an
allegedly defective step. The bus was shuttling her and other
passengers from the arrival terminal at the San Juan Airport to the
American Airlines terminal from which plaintiffs connecting flight
would depart.
The Court stated that "the Warsaw Convention
contemplates a form of strict liability for injuries sustained during
international air travel and makes no provision for actual or constructive
notice as a prerequisite for liability."3 Specifically, Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention applies "if the accident which caused the damage
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking. " 4
The Court discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Air France v.
Saks, 5 in which the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "accident"
for purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The Saks Court determined
that "liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if
a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger."6 Following the Supreme
Court's direction, the Second Circuit finds "any unusual or unexpected
event [to be] covered [by Chapter 17 of the Warsaw Convention] as
long as it is external to the plaintiff."7 The Court found that plaintiff
had satisfied causation as to defendant airlines because her injuries were
traceable causally to the operations of the defendant airlines, finding
that they had constructive control over the shuttle bus transporting their
passengers from terminal to terminal. According to the Court, Plaintiff
also had satisfied causation with respect to the defendant who actually

1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 127 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in
note following 49 U.S.C. §40105.
2. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 7 (quoting 49 U.S.C. §40105).
5. 470 U.S. 392, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
6. Id. at 9 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id. at 10.
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owned or operated the shuttle bus in question, although the Court noted
that a factual dispute still existed as to the actual ownership and control
of the shuttle bus. The Court then found that the incident in question
was an unusual or unexpected external event because "it is not usual or
expected that the stairs of a terminal bus would abruptly give way, nor
would an injury incurred by such a defect be within the normal
operation of an aircraft or airline." 8 As such, plaintiffs injury was
covered by the Warsaw Convention. Nevertheless, the Court found that
whether plaintiffs injury was caused by an "accident" was an issue for
a jury to decide. 9 A finding of fact by a jury that the step was defective
would impose liability under the Warsaw Convention, according to the
Court. 10
B. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance v. American Airlines, Inc. et al. 11

The Court held that the United States adheres to the Hague
Protocol 12 rather than the original Warsaw Convention. This litigation
involves the non-delivery of cargo that was scheduled to be shipped
from Brussels, Belgium to Tulsa, Oklahoma. 13 Plaintiffs, in a motion
for partial summary judgment, argued that the original Warsaw
Convention applied to the shipment at issue and requested that the Court
dismiss defendants' "eighth partial affirmative defense that its liability
is limited by the terms of the air waybill and the Hague Protocol." 14
Defendants opposed the motion to dismiss their eighth partial
affirmative defense and claimed that the original Warsaw Convention
does not apply because the United States adheres to the Hague Protocol.
Article 22 of the original Warsaw Convention would limit defendants'
liability to $20 per kilogram of goods unless defendants failed to set
forth the "agreed stopping places" (among other things) for the
shipment in the air waybill as required by Article 8 of the original
Warsaw Convention.
The Hague Protocol removed the "agreed
stopping places" requirement, among other changes to the original
terms.
The Court agreed with defendants that "when the United States
8. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 29-30.
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id.
11. 277 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter The Hague Protocol].
13. Id. at 265 .
14. Id. at 266.
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ratified the Montreal Protocol No. 4, 15 which amended the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol, the United States
acceded to the Hague Protocol" (italics added). 16 The Court noted that
the United States expressly consented to adhere to the Hague Protocol
when it ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4 because Article XVII (2) of the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 states that: "Ratification of this Protocol by
any State which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention as amended by
the Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of accession to the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague, 1955, and by the Protocol No. 4
of Montreal, 1975" (italics added). 17 It also stated that President
Clinton's Letter of Submittal to the Senate of the Montreal Convention
on June 23, 2000 made it clear that with the Montreal Protocol No. 4
"the United States also became bound by the provisions of the Hague
Protocol. ..." 18 In addressing plaintiffs' claims that the United States is
not bound by the Hague Protocol, the Court stated that "while
ratification of the Hague Protocol would resolve any remaining doubt
that the United States intends to be bound by the treaty, actual
ratification of the Hague Protocol is not necessary for the United States
to be bound by its terms ... it is sufficient that the United States ratified
Montreal Protocol No. 4." 19
II. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

A. Flores, et al. v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. 20

In Flores, et al. v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 21 Flores and other plaintiffs, all residents of Ilo,
Peru, brought personal injury claims against defendant Southern Peru
Copper Corporation (SPCC), a United States company, under the Alien

15. Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929,
amended by Protocol Done at Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9148,
reprinted in Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: A Legal
Handbook 401 (2000) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 4].
16. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 6-7.
17. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14506, at 7-8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 10-11.
20. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
21. Id. at 172; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 22 The ATCA provides that "the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. "23 Plaintiffs claimed that they (or their decedents)
were suffering (or had suffered) from severe lung disease caused by
pollution from SPCC's operations in Ilo, Peru. 24 Plaintiffs argued that
SPCC violated the law of nations (synonymous with customary
international law in the context of the ATCA) by infringing upon their
"right to life," "right to health," and right to "sustainable
development. "25 The district court concluded that "plaintiffs had failed
to state a claim under the ATCA because they had not pleaded a
violation of any cognizable principle of customary international law."26
In upholding the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
complaint, the Second Circuit discussed the decision in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 27 as the first case in which a federal appellate court
recognized the ATCA as a viable basis for relief. 28 The Filartiga Court
determined that it had jurisdiction under the ATCA to adjudicate the
claim of two Paraguayan citizens alleging that a former Paraguayan
police inspector-general had violated the customary international law
prohibition against official torture when he tortured and killed a
member of their family in Paraguay. 29 Thus, "the Filartiga Court not
only held that the ATCA provides a jurisdictional basis for suit, but also
recognized the existence of a private right of action for aliens only
seeking to remedy violations of customary international law or of a
treaty of the United States. " 30 The Filartiga Court then determined that
the ATCA permitted private causes of action for recently-identified
violations of customary international law, as opposed to only providing
causes of action for violations of customary international law as
customary international law was defined in 1789 when the ATCA
became law. 31 The Second Circuit also pointed to Kadic v. Karadzic 32
which made it clear that the ATCA allowed claims to be brought against

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Flores, 343 F.3d, at 143.
Id. at 143 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Flores, 343 F.3d, at 143.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Flores, 343 F.3d, at 149.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 151.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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private actors (as compared to the State official at issue in Filartiga). 33
The Kadic Court stated "that certain activities are of 'universal concern'
and therefore constitute violations of customary international law not
only when they are committed by state actors, but also when they are
committed by private individuals. " 34 The Second Circuit then noted
that there was a split among circuits as to whether the decision in
Filartiga, allowing private causes of action for recently-identified
customary international law, was correct.
The Second Circuit
concluded that
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively
resolved the complex and controversial questions regarding
the meaning and scope of the ATCA. Whatever the differing
perspectives among judges and scholars-differences that
ultimately can only be resolved by Congress or the Supreme
Court-Filartiga remains the law of this Circuit, and we
analyze the [P]laintiffs' claims under the framework set forth
in that case and its progeny. 35
The Second Circuit stated that "customary international law is
composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede
to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern. " 36 In order to
determine whether something is customary international law, "courts
must look at concrete evidence of customs and practices of states."37
The Second Circuit stated that
Article 3 8 [of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice] embodies the understanding of States as to what
sources offer competent proof of the content of customary
international law. It establishes that the proper primary
evidence consists only of those 'conventions' (that is,
treaties) that set forth 'rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states,' 'international custom' insofar as it
provides 'evidence of a general practice accepted as law,'
and 'the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations,' ... It also establishes that acceptable secondary (or
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Flores, 343 F.3d, at 150.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Flores, 343 F .3d, at 154.
Id. at 156.
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'subsidiary') sources summarizing customary international
law include 'judicial decisions,' and the works of 'the most
highly qualified publicists,' as that term would have been
understood at the time of the Statute's drafting. 38
The Second Circuit noted that "where the customs and practices of
States demonstrate that they do not universally follow a particular
practice out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern, that
practice cannot give rise to a rule of customary international law. " 39
As an initial matter, the Second Circuit rejected Plaintiffs' proposal
that a cognizable claim under the ATCA existed if the action at issue
was "shockingly egregious" under Zapata v. Quinn. 40 In Zapata, the
court rejected the claim under the ATCA by an alien winner of the New
York State Lottery that she was deprived of property without due
process of law when her lottery proceedings were awarded to her in an
annuity rather than in a lump sum. 41 The Zapata Court stated,
"jurisdiction is lacking under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the 'alien tort' statute),
which applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law.... ''42 The Second Circuit
clarified that Zapata stood for the proposition that "[t]he phrase
'shockingly egregious' is used descriptively, not prescriptively, merely
to indicate that 'because universal acceptance is a prerequisite to a rule
becoming binding as customary international law, only rules prohibiting
acts that are 'shockingly egregious' are likely to attain that status.''43
The Second Circuit concluded that "[n ]o matter how shocking or
egregious an action, it does not provide the basis for a claim under the
ATCA unless it violates customary international law. ''44
The Second Circuit then determined that plaintiffs did not allege a
violation of customary international law. 45 It concluded that the
assertions of "right to life" and "right to health" are not "clear and
unambiguous" rules of customary international law. 46 With respect to
the claim that customary international law prohibits intra-national

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Flores, 343 F.3d, at 157 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 158.
Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983).
Flores, 343 F.3d, at 159.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 160.
Flores, 343 F.3d, at 160.
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pollution, the Second Circuit held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that there was such a customary international law norm. The Second
Circuit reviewed the following evidence submitted by plaintiffs and
found them all insufficient to support a finding of customary
international law on this issue: (1) treaties, conventions and covenants;
(2) non-binding declarations of the United Nations General Assembly;
(3) non-binding multinational declarations of principle; (4)
multinational tribunals' decisions; and (5) affidavits of international
scholars.
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

A. Les/ye Knox et al. v. The Palestinian Liberation Organization et al. 47
The Court denied defendants' claim that Palestine, the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, or the Palestinian Authority were entitled to
In Knox, plaintiffs,
immunity from suit in the United States.
representative heirs and survivors of the decedent, brought a claim
under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331 et seq.,
against a shooter, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
Palestinian Authority (PA), the chairman of the PLO and leader of the
PA and other defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants were
responsible for decedent's death when decedent died as a result of a
shooting at a bat mitzvah in Israel. Defendants claimed immunity under
the provision of the ATA that bars an action against "a foreign state, an
agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of a foreign state or
an agency thereof acting within his or her official capacity or under
color of legal authority," 18 U.S.C. § 2337, and under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.S. § 1602 et seq. The
Court considered both claims to be identical because the term "foreign
state" has the same meaning under the ATA and the FSIA. 48 The Court
then rejected those claims, finding that Palestine was not recognized
politically in the United States such that it should be accorded the
privileges and immunities of sovereign States in the United States. In
its decision, the Court determined that Palestine was not a state under
international law as State is defined by the Restatement (Third)' s
definition. The Restatement (Third), which has been adopted by the
Second Circuit, defines a State as "an entity that has [ 1] a defined
territory and [2] a permanent population, [3] under the control of its

47. Knox v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
48. Id. at 430.
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own government, and that [4] engages in, or has the capacity to engage
in, formal relations with other such entities. ''49 With respect to whether
the PA has control over its territory and population within the meaning
the Restatement, the Court found that it did not because of the limited
governmental power of the PA. This limited governmental power
detracted from the claim that the Palestinian territory was an
independent State. The Court found that the PA explicitly did not have
the authority to conduct foreign relations under Article IX of the Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 50
The Court then found that even if there did exist a sovereign
Palestinian State under international law, such status would not
automaticallli make defendants immune from the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 Specifically, the Court noted that the United States has
not recognized or otherwise treated Palestine as a sovereign State. The
Court determined that although both the ATA and the FSIA excluded
foreign States from the application of those statutes, nothing in either
statute supported the position that traditional rules of comity would not
apply. The Court added that it is the executive branch that recognizes a
State as sovereign, not Congress or the Court. Since the executive
branch is putatively aware of the claim of sovereign immunity in this
case as well as several other cases, and has not expressed any position
that Palestine is a State for purposes of foreign sovereign immunity, the
Court declined "to find sovereign immunity where none may exist."52
The Court expressed its concern that if it were to find Palestine entitled
to foreign sovereign immunity, even though the United States had not
recognized Palestine as a State, that "may be deemed tantamount to an
incongruous act of 'judicial recognition' of a government not
recognized by the United States."53 Therefore, the Court declined to
take such action.
Finally, the Court rejected Defendants' arguments that the Court
was being asked to decide non-justiciable claims. The Court noted that
the intent of the ATA was to allow United States nationals justice for
the atrocities that they may have suffered through acts of terrorism. 54

49. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d, at 434 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
201 (1987)).
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id. at 438-39.
52. Id. at 446.
53. Id. at 448.
54. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d, at 448.
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B. Reers et al. v. Deutsche Bahn AG et al. 55

The Court granted Defendant Deutsche Bahn AG and its
subsidiaries' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, and Defendants Accor SA and Companie
Inter-Nationale des Wagons-Lits' motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens. Plaintiffs sued the nationally owned rail operator of
Germany, Deutsche Bahn AG, its subsidiaries Deutsche Bahn AutoZug
AG ("AutoZug") and Deutsche Bahn Reise & Touristik AG ("R&T"),
the Republic of France Corporations Accor SA, Companie InterN ationale des Wagons-Lits and others, in a wrongful death and survival
action stemming from the deaths of five of their family members due to
a fire aboard the train in which they were riding in France. The train
was en route to Germany. The railcar to which the decedents were
assigned was owned by AutoZug, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn.
The Court agreed with Deutsche Bahn that it had no subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims against Deutsche Bahn under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1603-10. 56 The Court
found that Deutsche Bahn, an instrumentality of the Republic of
Germany within the meaning of the FSIA, was not subject to the two
statutory exceptions to immunity claimed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had
claimed that Deustche Bahn had waived its immunity pursuant to
§1605(a)(l) or in the alternative, was not immune from the Court's
jurisdiction because the action was based "upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act cause[d] a direct effect in the
United States .... " 57 In support of their claim that Deutsche Bahn had
waived its immunity, plaintiffs pointed to the Convention Concerning
International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) to which Germany was a
signatory, and which Deutsche Bahn conceded provided that each
signatory "has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to damage
claims arising from its railway transportation activities in other
signatory countries ... " 58 The Court noted that under the treaty the
signatories agreed "that personal injury actions arising from railway
accidents can be filed only in the country in which the injury
occurred."59 The United States is not a signatory to the COTIF. The

55. Reers v. Deutsche Bahn AG, 320 F. Supp. 2d 140, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
56. Id. at 150.
57. Id. at 147.
58. Id. (citing Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (May 9, 1980),
app. A, art. 52, § 1).
59. Id.
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Court rejected Plaintiffs' claim that the waiver contained in the treaty
was "an implied waiver of immunity from suit in the United States
within the meaning of the FSIA" as an overly broad reading of the
treaty. 60 The Court noted that "the FSIA's implied waiver provision
should be construed narrowly" and stated that "[P]laintiffs provide no
justification for finding that through such a limited waiver [as that
contained in the COTIF], Germany and its instrumentalities have
impliedly waived sovereign immunity for lawsuits arising in nonsignatory jurisdictions and in countries other than the country in which
the injury giving rise to the suits occurred."61
The Court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the deaths resulted
from Deutsche Bahn's commercial activity outside of the United States
which caused a direct effect in the United States within the meaning of
the FSIA. All parties agreed that the provision of rail transportation in
Europe constituted a commercial activity. 62 However, the Court
determined that the fire causing the deaths at issue was a direct effect to
those who died in France, and did not constitute an exception to
sovereign immunity based on case law precedent discussed by the Court
in its opinion. 63
The Court then considered whether it had personal jurisdiction
over AutoZug and R&T. Plaintiffs were unable to allege direct contacts
between AutoZug and New York and only one contact between R&T
and New York, which the Court rejected as insufficient because the
contact did not show R&T "conducted a continuous course of business
in New York or executed ... contracts [with U.S. airlines which have
operations in New York to develop 'rail and fly' packages for U.S.
customers] in New York. " 64 The Court then considered Plaintiffs'
argument that AutoZug and R&T were "mere departments" of Deutsche
Bahn, such that Deutsche Bahn's direct contacts with New York would
be sufficient to result in personal jurisdiction. The Court pointed to the
flaw in plaintiffs' logic in that if AutoZug and R&T were mere
departments of Deutsche Bahn, they would then be entitled to Deutsche
Bahn' s sovereign immunity because as mere departments of Deutsche
Bahn, they "are not separate corporate entities at all, but rather alter
egos of an immune entity."65 The Court then rejected plaintiffs' claim

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 149.
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that it had jurisdiction over these two entities because they were doing
business through an agent in New York, and concluded that plaintiffs
had not made a prima facie showing of the Court's personal jurisdiction
over AutoZug and R&T.
The Court then considered, but did not fully decide, whether it had
jurisdiction over the Republic of France Corporations of Accor SA and
Companie Intem-Nationale des Wagons-Lits because it granted their
motion to dismiss based on the doctrine forum non conveniens. The
Court determined that France was an adequate alternative forum
because defendants were amenable to process there (under the COTIF)
and French law permits litigation of the subject matter of the suit. 66 The
Court then considered the gublic and private interest factors set forth in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. According to the Court, the public interest
factors include "(l) the administrative difficulties arising from
congested courts; (2) the imposition of jury duty on members of a
community unconnected to the litigation; (3) a forum's interest in
adjudicating local controversies; and (4) the potential difficulties arising
from the application of foreign law."68 While the Court found that the
first and fourth factors added little weight to its analysis because the
recent filling of judicial vacancies in New York meant less congestion
in the courts and no parties had indicated any issues with applying
French law, it determined that the second and third factors weighed
heavily in favor of litigation in France as the most appropriate forum.
This was due to France's strong interest in the lawsuit in terms of its
interest in having safe trains and partners that properly maintain the
trains and educate their employees, as well as the significant burden that
would be imposed on New York jurors. 69 In considering the Gilbert
private interest factors including "the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of
view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive,"70 and the financial hardship faced by each party in
litigating in a distant forum, the Court found that the action should be
dismissed in favor of litigation in France.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 158.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947)
Id. at 159 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-509).
Reers, 320 F. Supp. 2d, at 160.
Id. (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. Human Rights in China v. Bank of China 71

The Court granted Defendant Bank of China's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Human Rights in China's claim that the Bank of China
allegedly colluded with Chinese authorities to allow the Chinese
authorities to confiscate certain funds because the Court did not have
jurisdiction over the claim under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Human Rights in China (HRIC) alleged that the Bank of China (BOC)
(1) refused to cancel HRIC's wire transfer of $20,000 and return the
funds; (2) made fraudulent statements to HRIC's bank regarding the
status of the transferred funds; and (3) colluded with the Beijing Police
which resulted in the Police confiscating the transferred funds. 72 On
June 14, 1999, HRIC requested that $20,000 from its New York account
be transferred to the BOC's Beijing branch's bank account of "Jane
Lee" (this was a fictitious name used by the Court to conceal the
identity of the person at issue), a Chinese citizen. 73
The purpose of the funds was apparently to provide cash to
families of Chinese citizens killed in Tiananmen Square on June 4,
1989. 74 The HRIC usually concealed its identity out of concern that the
Chinese government's reaction would be hostile by identifying itself as
HRIC instead of "Human Rights in China."75 The bank transfer at
issue, however, was requested by a recently hired employee who
identified the sender as Human Rights in China instead of HRIC. 76
Upon learning of the error, HRIC became concerned about Jane Lee's
A series of
safety and sought to cancel the transaction. 77
communications between HRIC's New York bank and the BOC
occurred between June 15, 1999 and February 3, 2000 (in part through
Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Telecommunications' (SWIFT)
messages), but ultimately the funds were not returned to HRIC's New
York bank. 78
The BOC claimed that it had already credited the funds to Jane
Lee's account prior to receiving the communication from HRIC's New

71. Human Rights in China v. Bank of China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2003).
72. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 2.
73. Id. at 5-6.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 7-11.
77. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 7.
78. Id. at 8.
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York bank to cancel the transfer. 79 On approximately June 27, 1999,
Jane Lee was detained by the Beijing Police and questioned about the
funds that she claimed she had received no notice from the bank of their
being deposited. 80 The Beijing Police then allegedly required her to
withdraw the funds and immediately confiscated the funds from her. 81
The parties did not dispute that under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) the BOC was an ·"instrumentality" of the
Chinese government and therefore a "foreign State" under the FSIA. 82
In order for the Court to have jurisdiction over the BOC, one of the
exceptions to the immunities foreign States and instrumentalities
normally enjoy from suit in the United States must apply. 83 The Court
determined that only the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA
could possibly apply. 84 That exception states that immunity is not
available in any case
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign State; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 85
In order for the first or second commercial activity exception to
apply, the "claims being litigated must be 'based upon' the activities
within the United States-i.e., the United States commercial activities
must comprise 'those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a
plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case. "'86 The Court added that
"the Second Circuit imposes a requirement in lawsuits brought under
the first clause of the commercial activity exception that there be a
significant nexus between the United States commercial activities and
the plaintiffs cause of action." 87 Although the BOC engages in a
79. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 8.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 12-13.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 13.
85. Id. at 13-14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2)).
86. Id. at 15 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)(intemal
quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 15.
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significant amount of commercial activity in the United States, the
Court found that those generalized banking activities are insufficient to
satisfy either the first or second clauses of the commercial activity
exception because the SWIFT messages sent from the BOC to HRIC's
New York bank "were not acts carried on or performed 'in the United
States' ... [t]hey were acts performed in China, and that cannot be
altered by the fact that they were sent to a party within the United
States. " 88
The Court then examined whether the third clause of the
commercial activity exception applied. It determined that it had
insufficient information regarding whether there had been a "direct
effect in the United States" within the meaning of the FSIA. 89 The
Court discussed Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 90 which it
characterized as "[t]he leading case on the direct effect requirement."91
According to Weltover, "an effect is 'direct' under Section 1605(a)(2)
'if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's
activity. "'92
The Court addressed HRIC's claim that the BOC failed to rescind
the wire transfer and return the funds separately from the allegation that
the BOC colluded with Beijing Police to confiscate the money. With
respect to the failure to rescind the wire transfer, the Court stated that
"if HRIC could establish that, at the time the [BOC] learned of [HRIC's
bank's] request to reverse the wire transfer, it had not deposited the
money in Jane Lee's account and could have reversed the transaction,
then it would follow that the Bank's decision not to do so had a direct
effect on HRIC."93 Although the BOC had provided some evidence that
the funds had already been deposited into Jane Lee's account before
HRIC sought to cancel the transaction and claimed that banking
regulations would not require the rescission of a wire transfer once
funds were deposited, the Court found that additional factual
information was required on this issue. Therefore, the Court denied
BOC' s motion to dismiss these claims against it, but noted that BOC
could renew this argument after discovery was conducted on this
issue. 94

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 16.
See id. at 21.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 18.
Id. (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
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With respect to the claim that BOC colluded with Beijing Police so
that Police could confiscate the funds, the Court held that the FSIA
prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over that claim because the
alleged acts did not occur in the United States, but rather occurred in
China, and did not have a direct effect in the United States. 95 With
regard to this issue, the Court also noted that the actions of the Beijing
Police were intervening events and that if the BOC communicated with
the Beijing Police on this issue, its actions were political rather than
commercial. 96
IV. LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
A. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria9 7

Court granted motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of
Defendant Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG (GBK). Plaintiffs, the parents,
spouses and grandparents of eight Americans who died in a November
2000 ski train fire in Kaprun, Austria, claimed that the Court had
personal jurisdiction over GBK based on GBK's website advertising,
promotional activities and spoliation of evidence. 98 The Court noted
that in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction
under the forum State's laws and that the exercise of such jurisdiction
comports with due process. 99 The Court determined New York was the
forum State and therefore examined whether it had jurisdiction under
Sections 301 and 302(a) of New York Civil Procedure. It found that it
did not have general jurisdiction under Section 301 because GBK's
alleged marketing activities were not sufficient to constitute "doing
business" in New York. 100
The Court stated that GBK's alleged advertising abroad, even if it
constituted contacts with the United States, was insufficient to allow the
exercise of jurisdiction by New York courts over GBK. The Court also
found that allegations that GBK offered discount promotions to military
bases and businesses in New York was not sufficient to constitute
"doing business" in New York. Finally, the Court held that "a

95. Human Rights in China, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at 21-22.
96. Id. at 22-23.
97. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 9, 2003).
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 15.
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defendant's website alone cannot form the basis for general jurisdiction
in New York because 'the fact that a foreign corporation has a website
accessible in New York is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under
CPLR § 301. "' 101
The Court then examined whether jurisdiction was proper under
Section 302(a)(l), New York's long-arm statute which allows a court to
exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if "the nondomiciliary
transacts business within the state, [and] the claim against the
nondomiciliary arises out of that business activity." 102 The Court then
examined whether GBK's website activity and other marketing
activities allowed the exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
It concluded that they did not. The Court stated that while "interactive"
websites generally support a finding of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs
had failed to allege a substantial relationship between the website and
their claims. That is, there was no allegation that the website was
visited by the victims of the ski train fire or that they had used the
website to make their November 2000 reservations.
With respect to GBK's other marketing activities, such as
marketing to English-speaking people and discounts for U.S. military
personnel, the Court found that they were also insufficient to confer
long-arm jurisdiction under 302(a)(l) because Plaintiffs did not allege
that these activities "rose to the level of GBK's 'transacting business' in
New York either in terms of frequency or revenue and a connection
between the victims of the ski train fire and the discounts." 103 Finally,
the Court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that GBK's European marketing
activities were sufficient for the basis of personal jurisdiction because
contacts with U.S. military bases abroad, even assuming arguendo that
they constituted contacts with U.S. territory were nevertheless not
contacts with New York.
The Court then examined whether personal jurisdiction existed
under Section 302(a)(3) which allows personal jurisdiction to
be asserted over a non-domiciliary if the non-domiciliary
'commits a tortuous act without the state' injuring a person
within New York, and either (i) 'regularly does or solicits·
business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct,' or (ii) derives substantial revenue from interstate

101. In re Ski Train Fire, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 15.
102. Id. at 16.
103. Id. at 21-22.
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commerce and expects or reasonably should expect the
tortuous act to have consequences in the state. 104
The Court stated that exercise of jurisdiction under this provision
required the court to apply a "situs-of-injury test" to determine whether
the original event which caused the injury was in New York. According
to the Court, the original event from which the case arises was GBK's
tortuous acts relating to the ski train fire in Kaprun, Austria, not injury
to a person within New York. 105 Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiffs'
argument that because the Court ordered GBK to preserve evidence and
allegedly destroyed that evidence (that is, GBK's alleged spoliation of
evidence), the Court now had jurisdiction over GBK. The Court noted
that its "orders to preserve evidence explicitly preserved GBK's right to
challenge the underlying action on the basis of personal jurisdiction." 106
V. EXTRADITION

A. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic 107
In the matter of the Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, the
Court denied the application of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, a/k/a/
"Muhamed Sacirbey" (Sacirbey), a naturalized U.S. citizen, to be
released on bail pending a hearing on the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina's (BiH) formal request for his extradition. BiH requested
Sacirbey's extradition pursuant to its Mutual Extradition Treaty with the
United States ("Treaty") because "Sacirbey has been charged in BiH
with the crime of abuse of position or powers in violation of Article
358, Paragraph 3, of the BiH Criminal Code." 108 These charges
stemmed from allegations that Sacirbey had withdrawn funds from the
BiH's Permanent Mission to the United Nations and General Consulate
and from an account belonging to the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Investment Fund Ministry and transferred them into his
private bank accounts. 109 Subsequently, Sacirbey was arrested pursuant
to a Complaint for Arrest with a View Toward Extradition, and
detained.
Sacirbey applied for bail pending his extradition hearing. As an
104.
105.
106.
107.
I 08.
109.

In re Ski Train Fire, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22139, at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29.
In re Extradition ofMuhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 82.
Id.
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initial matter, the Court noted that "bail applications in extradition cases
are typically denied in the absence of 'special circumstances' [because]
if the accused were to be released on bond and thereafter absconded, the
mere surrender of a quantity of cash or other property 'would hardly
meet the international demand' and could cause the United States
government 'serious embarrassment.'" 110 The Court then considered
Sacirbey' s argument that his request for bail should be granted because
he does not need to show "special circumstances" for three reasons: (1)
the BiH has not formally charged him with any crime; (2) he is a U.S.
citizen; and (3) the criminal acts alleged by BiH occurred in the United
States. 111 The Court rejected all three claims.
With respect to the claim that he has not been formally charged in
BiH, the Court cited to Borodin v. Ashcroft, 112 in which the court stated
that "the 'charge' requirement is satisfied br a requesting nation's intent
to prosecute as evidenced by he record. " 11 The Court then found that
there was sufficient information in the BiH's request for extradition to
suggest an intent to prosecute Sacirbey, thereby satisfying the charge
requirement. The Court also rejected Sacirbey's position that because
he was a U.S. citizen and the Treaty did not compel the extradition of
American citizens, there was no "overriding national interest" regarding
his extradition and his constitutional individual liberty interests should
therefore prevail in this matter. 114 The Court noted that the Secretary of
State has the discretion to extradite a U.S. citizen. As such, "[t]he fact
that the United States is not compelled to extradite Sacirbey therefore
does not constitute a basis for ignoring the presumption that an accused
whose extradition is sought will not be granted bail in the absence of
'special circumstances. "' 115 Indeed, the Court stated that "there
consequently is a presumption against bail for someone whose
extradition has been formally sought." 116
The Court then rejected Sacirbey's claims that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to order his extradition because the alleged crimes were
committed in the United States rather than in BiH and he was not a
"fugitive" within the meaning of the Treaty. The Treaty provides for
the extradition of persons "who, having been charged with or convicted
110. Jn re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 83.
111. Id.
112. Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
113. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 84 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 85.
116. Id. at 83.
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of any of the crimes and offenses specified in the following article,
committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties,
shall seek asylum or be found within the territories of the other...." 117
The Court stated that the use of the phrase "committed within the
jurisdiction" must be construed in a manner to support BiH' s request,
and therefore meant subject to the legal authority of BiH to hear and
decide a case as proposed by the U.S. government rather than
Sacirbey's claim that it meant the crime was committed in BiH. 118
Finally, with respect to Sacirbey's "fugitive" claim, the Court noted that
the Treaty applied to the "fugitive or person so charged" and therefore
jurisdiction was not dependent on Sacirbey being a "fugitive." 119 The
Court then noted that, in any event, "fugitive" in American extradition
treaties is "usually construed to regard fugitive as one who is charged
with having committed a crime punishable under the laws of the
demanding State, but who is not to be found in that territory after
allegedly committing the crime." 120
Having thus disposed of Sacirbey's arguments that its request for
bail should be granted because he was not required to show "special
circumstances," the Court then considered and rejected Sacirbey's
arguments that under the "special circumstances" standard the Court
should grant bail. The Court found that Sacirbey's alleged "special
circumstances" of (1) eligibility for bail in BiH; (2) BiH's political
situation; (3) likelihood of prevailing at the extradition hearing; and (4)
alleged lack of flight risk, did not constitute "special circumstances"
such that he should be released from custody pending the extradition
hearing. With respect to being eligible for bail in BiH, the Court stated
that "there is no basis for Sacirbey's suggestion that the mere possibility
of bail in the requesting nation constitutes a special circumstance." 121
The Court then rejected Sacirbey's claim that the political situation in
BiH was fractious and he would be recognized, and stated, "There does
not appear to be any Second Circuit case law suggesting that persons
charged with alleged political offenses are entitled to special
consideration by being granted bail pending an extradition hearing," and
that in any event, there was no information on the record that Sacirbey

117. Jn re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 85 (quoted in
Treaty, Art. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 86 (quoting United States v. Marasco, 275 F. Supp. 492, 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 87.
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was not an "ordinary potential extraditee. " 122
With respect to Sacirbey's likelihood of success on the merits
argument, the Court rejected, as meritless, Sacirbey's argument that the
extradition request would fail because the Treaty covered persons who
committed crimes in BiH (and he did not). The Court also found that
Sacirbey's second likelihood of success on the merits claim, that the
evidence submitted in support of the extradition request was insufficient
on its face, would be unsupported and in any event would be addressed
at the extradition hearing. 123 The Court then found that even if Sacirbey
was not a flight risk, this was not a "special circumstance." Finally, the
Court considered whether the factors combined rose to the level of a
"special circumstance," and determined that Sacirbey's "special
circumstances" showing was insufficient to justify bail. 124

122. In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, 280 F.Supp.2d, at 88.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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